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THE EXPANDING RIGHTS OF THIRD PARTIES UNDER THE
INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE'S TAX PREPARERS PROJECT:
A LIMIT ON INTERNAL REVENUE FISHING EXPEDITIONS?
GREGORY A. MAZZA
0 the gallantFisher's life,
It is the best of any;
'Tis full of pleasure, void of strife,
And 'tis beloved of many:
Other joys
Are but toys:

Only this
Lawful is;
For our skill
Breeds no ill,
But content and pleasure.
The Compleat Angler'
The days when the Internal Revenue Service concentrated its audits primarily on taxpayers in high income brackets, gamblers, physicians and
members of family partnerships have long since passed. The IRS, under
the increasing burden of processing several million income tax returns each
year, is now taking advantage of the resources of modem technology. With
its employment of Automatic Data Processing, the IRS introduced in 1968 a
new computer technique, the "discriminant function," into its auditing procedures.2 The result has been not only the selection for audit of tax returns
of a wide cross-section of the population, but also an increased interest for
the filing of proper returns by taxpayers in middle and low income brackets
as well. This widespread concern, along with the increasing complexity of
the tax laws, in many instances has caused the taxpayer to seek out the
1. IZAAK WALTON, THE COMPLEAT ANGLER 186 (1936).
2. B. BrrrKER & L. STONE, FEDERAL INCOME ESTATh AND GIFT TAXATION, 909,
911 (4th ed. 1972). For a description and the implications of Automatic Data Processing see Kurio v. United States, 27 Am. Fed. Tax R. 2d 3-1 (S.D. Tex. 1970); Barron, How We Audit from Magnetic Tape, 40 TAxEs 83 (1972); Caplin, The Taxpayer-

Identifying Number System: The Key to Modern Tax Administration, 49 A.B.A.J.

1161 (1963).

Published by Digital Commons at St. Mary's University, 2022

1

St. Mary's Law Journal, Vol. 5 [2022], No. 4, Art. 6

ST. MARY'S LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 5:773

services of professional tax preparers or others holding themselves out to be
such. Because of this new demand on the market, the business of tax
preparation has expanded tremendously, and naturally, so have the evils
which plague many profit motivated ventures.
Although computerized analysis now plays a major role in the IRS's examination process, there still remain less sophisticated, but ever so effective,
methods for selecting returns to be audited. Under the duty imposed on
the Treasurey Department in section 7601 (a) 3 to canvass "each internal reveunue district and inquire after and concerning all persons therein who may
be liable to pay any internal revenue tax ' 4 and under the authority granted
to the IRS by section 76025 to summon and examine any persons and materials relevant to such an inquiry, the IRS has implemented just such an
effective method in its Tax Preparers Project.
Because the procedures employed in the Tax Preparers Project raise some
serious questions involving the rights of third parties6 in a tax investigation,
a presentation of the generally accepted rights and defenses which are cognizable to third parties under such an examination will be made here. An
analysis of the responsibilities and restrictions imposed upon the IRS by
Section 7602 of the Internal Revenue Code, and the reluctance of courts
to strictly enforce these limitations will also be set forth to point out some
of the major obstacles encountered in asserting the rights of the party under
investigation. This comment will examine the present legal status of these
rights in light of the effects of recent litigation evolving from the govern3. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954. Unless otherwise specified, all references to "section"
in the text are references to sections of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954.
4. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 7601(a).
5. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 7602 provides:

Examination of Books and Witnesses.
For the purpose of ascertaining the correctness of any return, making a return
where none has been made, determining the liability of any person for any internal
revenue tax or the liability at law or in equity of any transferee or fiduciary of any
person in respect of any internal revenue tax, or collecting any such liability, the
Secretary or his delegate is authorized(1) To examine any books, papers, records, or other data which may be relevant
or material to such inquiry;
(2) To summon the person liable for tax or required to perform the act, or any
officer or employee of such person, or any person having possession, custody, or
care of books of account containing entries relating to the business of the person
liable for tax or required to perform the act, or any other person the Secretary or
his delegate may deem proper, to appear before the Secretary or his delegate at a
time and place named in the summons and to produce such books, papers, records,
or other data, and to give such testimony, under oath, as may be relevant or material to such inquiry; and
(3) To take such testimony of the person concerned, under oath, as may be relevant or material to such inquiry.
6. Generally, a third party in a tax investigation is one with whom the taxpayer
has engaged in a monetary or business transaction, or one who has knowledge of or
is in possession of records concerning such a transaction (e.g., a bank, accountant, attorney, employer, corporation, partnership).
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ment's Tax Preparers Project, in the hope of providing today's legal practitioner with some guidelines for their application.
THE TAX PREPARERS PROJECT

In 1972 the IRS initiated a nationwide program aimed at investigating
individual tax preparers. 7 The purpose of the Tax Preparers Project is to
determine whether commercial tax preparers have been filing accurate returns for their clients. Certain tax preparers, s selected at random, are visited by special agents of the IRS's Intelligence Division under the guise of
ordinary customers. The special agents then provide the preparer with a
pre-established set of facts to be used for the purpose of having a federal
income tax return prepared. 9 Upon completion, the IRS carefully audits
the preparer's workproduct to determine whether the information furnished
him was properly used. If it appears that the information was not properly
applied, but evidence of wrongdoing is insufficient to warrant immediate
criminal prosecution, the case is transferred to the IRS's Audit Division.
The Audit Division then promptly issues a cease and desist order and requests from the suspect preparer copies of all other returns prepared by
him, the alleged purpose being to determine whether the tax liability of the
preparer's other clients had been inaccurately computed as well. 10 Only if
he refuses to comply with this request to make the material within his possession available will the IRS resort to a summons" compelling the production of the requested information. 12 If the evidence collected during
the investigation is sufficient to support criminal prosecution of the tax
preparer, then the case will be referred back to the Intelligence Division
to institute such proceedings."
LITIGATION GROWING OUT OF THE TAX PREPARERS PROJECT

The IRS-Catching Their Limit
In two significant decisions, United States v. Berkowitz14 and United
7. United States v. Theodore, 479 F.2d 749, 751 (4th Cir. 1973).
8. According to the testimony of a supervisory IRS agent, the Tax Preparers Project is aimed at individuals subscribing to no "code of professional ethics," and not at
attorneys and certified public accountants. United States v. Turner, 480 F.2d 272, 274
(7th Cir. 1973).
9.

IRS, MANUAL OF INSTRUCTIONS FOR REVENUE AGENTS § 6.01(1)

(Supp. 42G-

303 1973). This method of identifying suspect preparers without disclosing the official
identity of the special agent is known as the "shopping" technique, and the pre-established set of facts is called the "shopping package." Id.

10. United States v. Theodore, 479 F.2d 749, 752 (4th Cir. 1973).
11. This summons is issued pursuant to INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 7602(2).
12. United States v. Theodore, 479 F.2d 749, 752 (4th Cir. 1973).

13. Id. at 752.
14. 355 F. Supp. 897 (E.D. Pa. 1973), ajj'd, 488 F.2d 1235 (3d Cir. 1974).
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States v. Turner,1 5 the section 7602 summonses issued by special agents
of the IRS called for an appearance by the tax preparers and also compelled production of the names, addresses and social security numbers of
all clients and customers for whom returns were prepared in designated
years. The summonses were allegedly issued to determine the accuracy of
these returns. In both instances the tax preparers refused to comply with
the summonses and set forth certain defenses challenging their validity.
The tax preparer in Berkowitz asserted that "the IRS has no right to issue
a summons for records already in their possession."' 16 In response, the
court conceded that the information sought was in the hands of the Commissioner, but nonetheless rejected this argument because of the unjustifiable and enormous burden which would be placed on the IRS in locating
the desired information. 17 As a result, the tax preparer was required to
assist and facilitate the Commissioner's investigation by supplying the required data. The tax preparer also contended that he was protected by
an accountant-client privilege. This argument was disposed of by the
court, citing the Supreme Court's decision in Couch v. United States'8 which
held that no accountant-client privilege is recognized in federal cases.'
The next contention of the tax preparer in Berkowitz, that a section 7602
summons may be used only to secure information from the taxpayer under
investigation and not from third parties, was also denied by the court.
Under this section of the Code, it is the Commissioner's duty to ascertain
"the correctness of any return. 2 0° The court noted the absence of any prohibition in the Internal Revenue Code and cases construing it concerning summonses issued to third parties seeking information regarding the taxpayer
under investigation. The court also pointed out, citing the decision in
Couch, that the mere fact that information is sought from an individual
other than the taxpayer under investigation does not constitute sufficient
21
ground to decline enforcement of a summons.
In United States v. Turner22 the tax preparer, Herbert E. Turner, claimed
that production of the documents would violate his constitutional right protecting him against self-incrimination. The court held this complaint to be
unjustifiable. Because the inquiry was civil in nature, the court reasoned
that revealing the identity of the tax preparer's clients would pose "only a
15. 480 F.2d 272 (7th Cir. 1973).
16. United States v. Berkowitz, 355 F. Supp. 897, 900 (E.D. Pa. 1973), aff'd, 488
F.2d 1235 (3d Cir. 1974).
17. Id. at 901.
18. 409 U.S. 322 (1973).
19. Id. at -, 93 S.Ct. at 619, 34 L.Ed.2d at 558.
20. IrT. REv.CODE OF 1954, § 7602 (emphasis added).
21. United States v. Berkowitz, 355 F. Supp. 897, 901 (E.D. Pa. 1973), all'd, 488
F.2d 1235 (3d Cir. 1974).
22. 480 F.2d 272 (7th Cir. 1973).
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mere possibility of incrimination.

' 23

This disclosure, though helpful to the

government in locating the requested returns, was held not to involve a sub-

stantial risk tantamount to the virtual admission of criminal wrongdoing on
the part of the tax preparer. Even should the government, as a result of the
disclosure, determine the returns prepared by Turner to be inaccurate, the
burden nonetheless would still remain upon the IRS to establish that he
willfully violated the internal revenue laws. 24 The court also pointed out
that the tax preparer did not, because of the nature of the evidence sought,
have an expectation of protected privacy or confidentiality which the fifth
amendment would protect.25 On this basis it was held that the mere possibility that his fifth amendment rights would be violated is insufficient to
overcome the "strong policies in favor of disclosure."'2 6
The tax preparers in both Berkowitz and Turner objected to the section

7602 summonses as being too vague, overbroad and as constituting a burdensome "fishing expedition" on the part of the government.

The court

in Berkowitz rejected this argument, concluding that the summons was precise and limited to the specific information directly related to the investiga-

tion of the tax liabilities of the preparer's clients. 27 This court also referred
to the "potentially fruitless" search with which the IRS would be faced, unless the tax preparer produced the requested information, stating that the
burden "would be significantly less" upon the tax preparer. 28 In a similar
23. Id. at 278.
24. id. at 277.
25. Id. at 277-78. Justice Harlan, in Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967),
pointed out the increasing trend of the courts to apply constitutional protections wherever they have determined that an individual has a "reasonable expectation of privacy"
in an area subject to governmental intrusion. Id. at 360-62 (concurring opinion). See
generally Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484-86 (1965); W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAw OF TORTS § 117 (4th ed. 1971) and cases contained therein.
26. United States v. Turner, 480 F.2d 272, 278 (7th Cir. 1973).
27. United States v. Berkowitz, 355 F. Supp. 897, 901 (E.D. Pa. 1973), aff'd., 488
F.2d 1235 (3d Cir. 1974). The court pointed out that where the examination exceeds
the government's investigative power because it is overbroad or unrelated to the matter
under inquiry, the issuance of a section 7602 summons is precluded. Id., citing United
States v. Harrington, 388 F.2d 520, 523 (2d Cir. 1968).
28. United States v. Berkowitz, 355 F. Supp. 879, 901 (E.D. Pa. 1973), a!f'd, 488
F.2d 1235 (3d Cir. 1974). In effect, the court is penalizing the tax preparer because it
believes he would have less difficulty in locating the requested information. Under
the circumstances the court appears to be balancing the burden on both parties in
order to determine whether the requested documents should be forthcoming. The
Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit takes a dim view of such reasoning. It
criticized a district court decision which reasoned that the Commissioner would have
an "enormous and unjustifiably expensive undertaking" (United States v. Theodore,
479 F.2d 749, 755 (4th Cir. 1973) to search all of the returns in the regional filing
center to find those prepared by the tax preparer. "There is nothing in the record to
support the conclusion that when IRS knows the name and social security number of
a taxpayer, the Service cannot readily obtain his return." Id. at 755. The court
therefore remanded its reversal to the district court to determine whether or not the
IRS has any reasonable or practical means to compile the desired lists. Id. at 755.
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manner, the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit rejected this same
argument asserted by Turner. He, too, claimed that the government's "fishing expedition" amounted to an illegal search and seizure and that the summons was legally insufficient as it failed to name the persons whose returns
were to be examined. In reply the court upheld both the reasonableness
and legality of the summons by referring to the authority granted the IRS
under section 7602, to examine any person, records or data which may be
relevant or material to such inquiry. Furthermore, by showing that the
inspection of the records in question "might throw light upon the correctness
of a taxpayer's return,"' 29 the government met its burden as to the relevancy and materiality of the investigation. The court denied the necessity
of specifically naming in the summons the persons whose returns are 30desired for examination, stating a "John Doe" summons to be sufficient.
The tax preparers in Berkowitz and Turner also attacked the summonses
of the IRS as having been issued in bad faith, pursuant to an investigation
being conducted for the improper purpose of obtaining evidence for their
criminal prosecution. The court in Berkowitz rejected this argument as did
the court in Turner. In so doing, both courts referred to the decision of the
Supreme Court in Donaldson v. United States31 which established that a section 7602 summons need only be issued (1) in good faith, and (2) prior
to a recommendation for prosecution 32 in order to be issued in connection
with a tax investigation. The courts in both cases further pointed out that
the tax preparers were neither under indictment nor had they been recommended for criminal prosecution. Consequently, the government's purpose
in each case was found to be proper. Even beyond this, the decision in
Turner required the tax preparer to make a showing that the summons
83
was totally lacking in any civil purpose.
Berkowitz then, condones the procedures of the IRS's Tax Preparers Project, at least insofar as it involves the production of names, addresses and
social security numbers of a tax preparer's clients, especially where the burden of locating such information would be greater upon the IRS than it
would be upon the tax preparer. It also stands for the proposition that the
IRS is entitled to do some "fishing" into the records of the tax preparer
where he has erred in the preparation of a single (sham) tax return.
The basic foundation of the Turner decision is the government's alleged
"legitimate purpose" of determining the "civil tax liability" of the tax preparer's clients. The court interprets this legitimate purpose to indicate that
the issuance of a section 7602 summons is therefore proper, in good faith,
29. United States v. Turner, 480 F.2d 272, 279 (7th Cir. 1973).
30. Id. at 279.

31. 400 U.S. 517 (1971).
32. Id. at 536.

33. United States v. Turner, 480, F.2d 272, 275 (7th Cir. (1973).
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and enforceable, even if it should result in criminal prosecution of the tax
preparer. Such legitimate purpose, according to the court, also negates
the preparer's right to assert his fifth amendment privilege where self-incrimination is but a possibility. Finally, it is this same legitimate purpose
once again which denies the tax preparer an opportunity to assert his fourth
amendment rights. The government is given "license to fish" for any inforrelevant to the
mation which a tax preparer might possess so long as it is
34
not.
or
named
be
they
whether
clients,
his
of
civil tax liability
The IRS-Limiting Their Catch
Unlike the decisions in Berkowitz and Turner, the Court of Appeals for
the Fourth Circuit in United States v. Theodore35 did not enforce the section 7602 summons issued to the tax preparer. 3 6 Unlike Berkowitz and
Turner, however, the summons issued in Theodore compelled the production of more than merely the names, addresses and social security numbers
of the tax preparer's clients. It additionally called for the production of
(1) All accounting records, workpapers, correspondence, memoranda
and other documents in your possession or used by you in connection
with the preparation of all Federal Income Tax returns for your customers and clients for the years 1969, 1970, and 1971.
(2) All retained copies of 1969, 1970 and 1971 Federal Income Tax
returns, the3 7originals of which were prepared by you for your customers
and clients.
A primary objection against the summons in Theodore was that it was
too vague and overly broad to be enforceable, 38 and it was on the merits
of this argument that the court denied enforcement of the summons. This
decision limits the authority of the IRS under section 7602 to acquire only
information relating to the correctness of a "particular return or to a particular person." 3 9 The court also denied sanction of open-ended "John Doe','
summonses where they invoke more than a single or small group of unidenti34. Note that the court, in finding a John Doe summons to be sufficient, relied
upon United States v. Theodore, 347 F. Supp. 1070, 1075 (D.S.C. 1972), rev'd, 479
F.2d 749 (4th Cir. 1973). See also United States v. Carter, CCH STAND. FED. TAX.
REP., U.S. TAX CAs.
9154, at 83, 167 (5th Cir. Dec. 26, 1973).
35. 479 F.2d 749 (4th Cir. 1973).
36. Id. at 755.
37. Id. at 751.
38. Id. at 754. The tax preparer also argued that the fifth amendment constituted
a valid ground for refusing to produce the records of his accounting firm. The court
rejected this argument, stating that "the privilege of self-incrimination is a purely personal one which cannot be invoked by or on behalf of a corporation or professional
association." Id. at 753. As for the contention that the summons was issued to con-

duct a criminal investigation of the tax preparer, the court again denied the objection,

citing Donaldson and giving the same reasons offered in Berkowitz and Turner. Id.
at 753-54.
39. United States v. Theodore, 479 F.2d 749, 755 (5th Cir. 1973).
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fied taxpayers. 40 In answer to Theodore's final claim that the Commissioner
already had copies of the requested returns in his possession, the court
pointed out that it would be an abuse of process to enforce a section 7602
summons unless the Commissioner could demonstrate that such records
were not in his possession or that he had "no practical way of obtaining
the desired item."' 4 1 The court did state, however, that Section 7602 of the

Internal Revenue Code authorizes the Commissioner to obtain the names
of such taxpayers, but again, only if the information is not otherwise
42
accessible to him.
Theodore, then, rejects the reasoning which granted "fishing licenses"
to the IRS by the courts in Berkowitz and Turner. It upholds the tax pre-

parer's fourth amendment protection against unreasonable searches and
seizures, and stands in opposition to the tactics used by the IRS in their
Tax Preparers Project.
RIGHTS OF THE TAX PREPARER

Because of the relative infancy of the IRS's Tax Preparers Project, and the
virtual absence of any previous cases comparable to the litigation arising
from this IRS enforcement procedure, Berkowitz, Turner and Theodore

presented problems unique to any prior adjudication. 43 While the courts

have tended to treat third parties in the same manner as taxpayers with re-

gard to the issuance of a section 7602 summons, 44 a review of the cases and

40. Id. at 754.
41. Id. at 755.
42. Id. at 755.
43. Somewhat similar is United States v. Dupont, 169 F. Supp. 572 (D. Mass.
1959). Here the court denied the motion of a defendant tax preparer to exclude evidence obtained by IRS agents from examining copies of his client's tax returns which
he had presented to them. In this case, however, the tax preparer was informed at
the beginning of the investigation that it was his own tax liability which was in question, and not that of his clients.
44. In United States v. Berkowitz, 355 F. Supp. 897 (E.D. Pa. 1973), af'd, 488
F.2d 1235 (3d Cir. 1974) the court stated that "the mere fact that information is sought
from a person other than the taxpayer under investigation is an insufficient ground upon
which to decline to enforce a summons." Id. at 901. Section 7602 summonses were
enforceable in the following cases against third parties: Couch v. United States, 409
U.S. 322 (1973); Donaldson v. United States, 400 U.S. 517 (1971); United States v.
Powell, 379 U.S. 48 (1964); United States v. Hickok, 481 F.2d 377 (9th Cir. 1973);
United States v. Luther, 481 F.2d 429 (9th Cir. 1973); United States v. Turner, 480
F.2d 272 (7th Cir. 1973); United States v. Egenberg, 443 F.2d 512 (3d Cir. 1971);
United States v. Artman, 435 F.2d 1375 (6th Cir. 1970); United States v. Held, 435
F.2d 1361 (6th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 1010 (1971); DiPiazza v. United
States, 415 F.2d 99 (6th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 949 (1971); United States
v. DeGrosa, 405 F.2d 926 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 973 (1969); United States
v. Harrington, 388 F.2d 520 (2d Cir. 1968); Hinchcliff v. Clarke, 371 F.2d 697 (6th
Cir.), cert. denied, 387 U.S. 941 (1967); Tillotson v. Boughner, 333 F.2d 515 (7th
Cir.), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 913 (1964). United States v. Oaks, 360 F. Supp. 855
(C.D. Cal. 1973); United States v. Buck, 356 F. Supp. 370 (S.D. Tex. 1973), aff'd,
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legal literature 45 displays that some confusion has been generated as to
which principles, defenses, and rights are applicable.
Generally, objection to a section 7602 summons is raised on the grounds
that it violates: (1) statutory limitations, (2) protection under privileged
communications, (3) fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination
or (4) fourth amendment protection against unreasonable searches and
seizures. Each ground for objection, however, is not always appropriate for
every issuance of a section 7602 summons, and whether the recipient is a
taxpayer or third party will influence the availability of these defenses to
46
him.
Statutory Limitations
The first statutory limitation that could possibly give rise to a successful
defense to a section 7602 summons involves a time limitation. Under section 6501(a), 4 7 assessment of tax liability for the year under investigation
must be made within 3 years after the return is filed. However, the mere

showing that the statute has run will not necessarily terminate the government's authority to issue a section 7602 summons. 4 8

The burden still re-

479 F.2d 1327 (5th Cir.); United States v. Jones, 351 F. Supp. 132 (M.D. Ala. 1972);
United States v. Crespo, 281 F. Supp. 928 (D. Md. 1968).
45. See generally Barney, The Protection of Documents in Criminal Tax Fraud
Cases, 44 TAXES 626 (1966); Cohen, Accountant's Workpapers in Federal Tax Investigations, 21 TAX. L. REV. 183 (1966); Fahey, Testimonial Privilege of Accountants in
Federal Tax Fraud Investigations, 17 TAX. L. REV. 491 (1962); Fuller, Taxation: Discovery of Documents Relating to the Tax Liability of the Taxpayer in the Possession
of His Attorney, 17 OKLA. L. REV. 125 (1964); Gilbert, Emanations of the "Shiftof-emphasis" Theory-The "Improper Purposes" Doctrine Revisited: Taxpayers' Rights
to Challenge Special Agents' Summonses of "Third Party" Bank Records, 5 SUFFOLK
U.L. REV. 35 (1970); Note, Constitutional Aspects of Federal Tax Investigations, 57
CoLUM. L. REv. 676 (1957); Note, Criminal Tax Fraud Investigations: Limitations on
the Scope of the Section 7602 Summons, 25 U. FLA. L. REV. 114 (1972); Comment,
Constitutional Law-Taxpayer Does Not Have Fifth Amendment Privilege When His
Private Records are in the Hands of an Accountant, 3 MEMPIS ST. L. REV. 383 (1973);
Note, Constitutional Law-Fourth Amendment-Evidence Obtained by Illegal Search
and Seizure is Inadmissible in Civil Tax Proceeding-Governmenthas Burden of Going
Forward with Untainted Evidence to Support Deficiency Notice, 48 N.Y.U.L. REV. 197
(1973); Note, Constitutional Law-Self Incrimination-Fifth Amendment Protection
Does Not Extend to Documents in Possession of Taxpayer's Attorney, 5 ST. MARY'S

L. REV. 337 (1973).
46. The cases cited in note 44 and the discussion of these and other cases by the
literature cited in note 45 show the confusion that litigants involved in tax investigations have experienced in defending their position. It is beyond the scope of this paper
to deal with each objection which might be raised in every situation concerning a
section 7602 summons, but those defenses which are applicable to the tax preparer in

this area will be discussed.

47. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954.
48. United States v. Powell, 379 U.S. 48, 58 (1964); United States v. Giordano,
419 F.2d 564, 568 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 1037 (1970); Foster v. United
States, 265 F.2d 183, 187 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 360 U.S. 912 (1959). In cases in
which the understatement of gross income exceeds 25 percent, the general 3 year stat-
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mains upon the recipient of the summons to show that the court abused its
discretion in enforcing it.49 The Commissioner is entitled to an examination of the records of a taxpayer or third party5" where his stated purpose
is the determination of the liability of "any person for any internal revenue
tax" whether or not it has been barred by the time limitation. 5 '

Conse-

quently, the pleading of this time limitation as a defense will be of little
service to any summoned party where the section 7602 summons has been
issued for a "proper purpose. 52
Another statutory limitation on the issuance of this summons, at least
from the taxpayer's standpoint, is that which precludes unnecessary examination of his books of account without written notice from the IRS. 53 There

has been considerable discussion, however, as to what constitutes an unnec-

54
essary examination under Section 7605(b) of the Internal Revenue Code.

Because only one inspection of a taxpayer's books is permitted for each taxable year, government arguments generally focus on the "continuing" nature of the investigation.

In sustaining this contention, the courts have held

that subsequent examinations do not constitute a second inspection requiring written notice where the IRS investigation has not been completed. 55
ute has been extended to 6 years. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 6501(e). In cases of
fraudulent returns no time limitation is applicable. INT. REV. CoDE OF 1954, § 6501

(c).

49. United States v. Powell, 379 U.S. 48, 58 (1964).
50. Foster v. United States, 265 F.2d 183, 187 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 360 U.S.
912 (1959).
51. Id. at 187, quoting INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 7602.
52. See discussion of proper purpose pp. 789-91 infra.
53. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 7605(b) provides:
No taxpayer shall be subjected to unnecessary examination or investigations, and
only one inspection of a taxpayer's books of account shall be made for each taxable year unless the taxpayer requests otherwise or unless an authorized internal
revenue officer, after investigation, notifies the taxpayer in writing that an additional inspection is necessary.
54. United States v. Nashban, 32 Am. Fed. Tax R.2d 5308, 5309 (E.D. Wis.
1973); United States v. Fordin, 30 Am. Fed. Tax R.2d 5249, 5251 (E.D.N.Y. 1972);
United States v. Schwartz, 469 F.2d 977, 985 (5th Cir. 1972); United States v.
Giordano, 419 F.2d 564, 567 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 1037 (1970); Hinchcliff v. Clarke, 371 F.2d 697, 700 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 387 U.S. 941 (1967); In
Application of Magnus, 299 F.2d 335, 337 (2d Cir. 1962); United States v. Crespo,
281 F. Supp. 928, 933 (D. Md. 1968).
55. United States v. Crespo, 281 F. Supp. 928, 933 (D. Md. 1968); see United
States v. Giordano, 419 F.2d 564, 567 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 1037 (1970);
In Application of Magnus, 299 F.2d 335, 337 (2d Cir. 1962). But see United States
v. Fordin, 30 Am. Fed. Tax R.2d 5249 (E.D.N.Y.

1972) where the court criticized

the IRS's interpretation of a completed investigation. It held "any repetitive exam"
to be untenable under the Supreme Court's decision in United States v. Powell, 379
U.S. 48 (1968) where the required notice was not forthcoming. As the court in
Fordin points out, the hands of the recipient of the summons are virtually tied under
the relevant definition of a closed case contained in Rev. Proc. 68-28, 1968-2 CUM.
BULL. 912. This definition as applied in Fordin
permits the Internal Revenue Service to exercise total discretion in determining
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This reasoning, however, has been criticized on the basis that courts have
confused the meaning of a continuing investigation with that of a continuing
inspection56 Section 7605(b) provides for only one inspection (regardless

of whether an investigation is continuing or not).

Hence, where an internal

revenue agent has examined the records in question, the statutory notice
57
must be given before doing so again.
Presently, the usefulness of this limitation to the tax preparer is non-existent, for it has been held that the single inspection rule does not apply
to the workpapers of an accountant nor to the records of a taxpayer in an
accountant's possession.58 This section of the statute relates solely to the
taxpayer and his books, and is not applicable to third party investigations. 5 9
Privileged Communications
The right to assert confidentiality, another source of objection to enforcement of a section 7602 summons, finds its roots in the attorney-client privilege.6" However, as the individuals summoned under the Tax Preparers

Project are generally not attorneys, 61 this paritcular privilege remains inaccessible to them. An offshoot of the attorney-client relationship, often
referred to as the accountant-client relationship, has in some instances provided relief for summoned third parties.6 2 Under the defense of this privilege, the refusal to produce a taxpayer's records, which have been prepared by an accountant, has been sustained by the courts, but only under
"closure" of a case ....
* [T]he Internal Revenue Service has only to refuse to settle a case and then
forbear from issuing a deficiency notice to permit it, under its own rules, to continue investigation as long as it wishes, however tiresome it may be for the taxpayer and without notice required by statute.
United States v. Fordin, 30 Am. Fed. Tax R.2d 5249, 5252 (E.D.N.Y. 1972).
56. United States v. Fordin, 30 Am. Fed. Tax R.2d 5249, 5251 (E.D.N.Y. 1972);
United States V. Schwartz, 332 F. Supp. 820, 822 (N.D. Ga. 1971), rev'd, 469 F.2d
977 (5th Cir. 1972).
57. United States v. Fordin, 30 Am. Fed. Tax R.2d 5249, 5253 (E.D.N.Y. 1972).
But see United States v. Crespo, 281 F. Supp. 928, 933-34 (D. Md. 1968).
58. Hinchcliff v. Clarke, 371 F.2d 697, 700 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 387 U.S. 941
(1967); accord, Guerkink v. United States, 354 F.2d 629, 631 (7th Cir. 1965); Bouschor v. United States, 316 F.2d 451, 457 (8th Cir. 1963); De Masters v. Arend, 313
F.2d 79, 86 (9th Cir.), petition for cert. dismissed, 375 U.S. 936 (1963).
59. Hubner v. Tucker, 245 F.2d 35, 38-39 (9th Cir. 1957); accord, United States
v. Howard, 360 F.2d 373, 380 (3d Cir. 1966).
60. For discussion of the development of confidential relationships and the attorney-client privilege, see Fuller, Taxation: Discovery of Documents Relating to the Tax
Liability of the Taxpayer in the Possession of His Attorney, 17 OKLA. L. REV. 125
(1964); Note, ConstitutionalAspects of Federal Tax Investigations, 57 COLUM. L. REV.
676 n.6 (1957). See also United States v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 89 F. Supp. 357
(D. Mass. 1950).
61. United States v. Turner, 480 F.2d 272, 274 (7th Cir. 1973).
62. See generally Fahey, Testimonial Privilege of Accountants in Federal Tax
FraudInvestigations, 17 TAx. L. REV. 491 (1962).
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No accountant-client privilege per se ex-

nor is that privilege recognized in the federal court

system. 6 5 Hence, recourse to such a confidential relationship as a defense
in a federal tax investigation can only be had where the accountant can
show that he was acting in the capacity of a professional legal advisor,66 or
where the records in question were produced subsequent to the taxpayer's
hiring of counsel, and in contemplation of litigation.6 7 In other words,

if the accountant is not an attorney, it is imperative that he be assisting an
attorney in rendering legal services to the taxpayer with litigation in mind.
As this would seldom be the case with regard to the tax preparer investigated under the Tax Preparers Project, and because the workpapers prepared
by an accountant are clearly the property of the accountant himself, 68 the
defense of accountant-client privilege would be virtually unavailable to a
tax preparer.
Privilege Against Self-Incrimination
Probably no objection to enforcement of a section 7602 summons has
created more confusion than the application of fifth amendment privileges.
The Supreme Court, however, in Couch v. United States69 has recently
cleared up many of the misconceptions concerning the assertion of this constitutional protection against self-incrimination. In the past, the use of this
privilege by accountants and third parties has been more significant in behalf of the taxpayer rather than the party asserting the privilege.70 The de63. Reisman v. Caplin, 375 U.S. 440, 449 (1964); United States v. Cote, 456 F.2d
142, 144 (8th Cir. 1972); United States v. Judson, 322 F.2d 460, 462 (9th Cir. 1963);
United States v. Kovel, 296 F.2d 918, 922 (2d Cir. 1961); accord, Colton v. United
States, 306 F.2d 633, 639 (2d Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 951 (1963); United
States v. Schmidt, 360 F. Supp 339, 346 (M.D. Pa. 1973).
64. Couch v. United States, 409 U.S. 322, -, 93 S. Ct. 611, 617, 34 L. Ed. 2d
548, 556 (1973); accord, Lustman v. Commissioner, 322 F.2d 253, 259 (3d Cir. 1963).
65. Falsone v. United States, 205 F.2d 734, 741-42 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 346
U.S. 864 (1953); Himmelfarb v. United States, 175 F.2d 924, 939 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 338 U.S. 860 (1949); United States v. Bowman, 236 F. Supp. 548, 550-51
M.D. Pa. 1964), aff'd, 358 F.2d 421 (3d Cir. 1966); United States v. Culver, 224 F.
Supp. 419, 434 (D. Md. 1963); Petition of Borden Co., 75 F. Supp. 857, 860 (N.D.
Il1. 1948).
66. United States v. Schmidt, 360 F. Supp. 339, 346 (M.D. Pa. 1973), quoting
8 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2292, at 554 (McNaughton rev. ed. 1961); accord, Reisman
v. Caplin, 375 U.S. 440, 449 (1964); United States v. Judson, 322 F.2d 460, 462 (9th
Cir. 1963); United States v. Kovel, 296 F.2d 918, 922 (2d Cir. 1961).
67. United States v. Judson, 322 F.2d 460, 467 (9th Cir. 1963); Colton v. United
States, 306 F.2d 633, 637 (2d Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 951 (1963); United
States v. Kovel, 296 F.2d 918, 922 (2d Cir. 1961).
68. United States v. Zakutansky, 401 F.2d 68, 70 (7th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 393
U.S. 1021 (1969). See also Sale v. United States, 228 F.2d 682, 686 (8th Cir. 1956);
United States v. Boccuto, 175 F. Supp. 886, 890 (D.N.J.), appeal dismissed, 274 F.2d
860 (3d Cir. 1959).
69. 409 U.S. 322 (1973).
70. See Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43, 69-70 (1906); United States v. White, 477
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cision in Couch reaffirmed the decisions of several lower courts, 71 establish-

ing fifth amendment rights to be purely personal,72 and therefore, incapable

of being asserted for another. Although this privilege has extended to the
production of records, papers and writings since 1886, 73 its personal nature
precludes application to the records of corporations or professional associations.7 4 Where the tax preparer is such a business entity, the privilege
against self-incrimination cannot be asserted for his own protection nor that
75
of the corporation.
The crucial aspect of the fifth amendment privilege comes into play where
the tax preparer is not organized under this type of business association. 76
Under these circumstances, it must be remembered that he is asserting this
privilege in his own behalf and not for a third party. Consequently, there
is no reason why the tax preparer should be compelled to give evidence
against himself. 77 According to Turner, however, if the thrust of the summons is directed at an "essentially civil area of inquiry," the tax preparer
is virtually without constitutional protection, since government policies favor

disclosure. 78 Where the IRS alleges that determination of civil liability
is an aspect of the investigation, the courts have been more than willing to

F.2d 757, 759 (5th Cir. 1973); United States v. Judson, 322 F.2d 460, 463 (9th Cir.
1963); United States v. Schmidt, 360 F. Supp. 339, 344 (M.D. Pa. 1973); In re Brumbaugh, CCH 1962 STAND. FED. TAX. REP. U.S. TAX CAS. (62-2, at 85,183) 1 9521 (S.D.
Cal. May 31, 1962); United States v. Boccuto, 175 F. Supp. 886, 889 (D.N.J.), appeal
dismissed, 274 F.2d 860 (3d Cir. 1959); United States v. Willis, 145 F. Supp. 365, 368
(M.D. Ga. 1955).
71. United States v. Egenberg, 443 F.2d 512, 516 (3d Cir. 1971); United States
v. Goldfarb, 328 F.2d 280 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 976 (1964); Bouschor v.
United States, 316 F.2d 451, 458 (8th Cir. 1963); In re Fahey, 300 F.2d 383 (6th
Cir. 1961); United States v. Boccuto, 175 F. Supp. 886, 888 (D.N.J.), appeal dismissed,
274 F.2d 860 (3d Cir. 1959); United States v. Willis, 145 F. Supp. 365, 368 (M.D.
Ga. 1955).
72. Couch v. United States, 409 U.S. 322, -, 93 S. Ct. 611, 616, 34 L. Ed. 2d
548, 553 (1973).
73. Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 634-35 (1886).
74. United States v. White, 322 U.S. 694, 699 (1944); Wilson v. United States,
221 U.S. 361, 383 (1911); Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43, 69 (1906); United States
v. Held, 435 F.2d 1361, 1365-66 (6th Cir. 1970), cert. denitd, 401 U.S. 1010 (1971).
75. United States v. Theodore, 479 F.2d 749, 753 (4th Cir. 1973).
76. In United States v. Turner, 480 F.2d 272 (7th Cir. 1973) the court stated:
"It is true that Turner may be able to assert a fifth amendment defense to production
of his records that is unavailable to a person holding corporate records or documents
belonging to another." Id. at 274. The privilege against self-incrimination has also
been held to apply to the personal records owned by a partnership. United States v.
Slutsky, 352 F. Supp. 1105, 1107 (S.D.N.Y. 1972), appeal docketed, 26 U.S.L.W. 3389
(U.S. Jan. 8, 1974) (No. 1032).
77. The courts have often recognized the importance of protecting the individual's
rights against compulsory self-incrimination.
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436
(1966); accord, Mathis v. United States, 391 U.S. 1, 4 (1968); Malloy v. Hogan, 378
U.S. 1 (1964); United States v. Dickerson, 413 F.2d 1111, 1116 (7th Cir. 1969).
78. United States v. Turner, 480 F.2d 272, 278 (7th Cir. 1973).
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sustain their claim. 79 The reason for this is that all such inquiries into records and tax returns are readily susceptible to allegations of civil tax liability.80 The tax preparer's only defense in this situation is to establish that
the government's investigation is directed towards him and pervaded with
"dominant criminal overtones." 8' By placing the purpose of the inquiry at
issue in this manner, the tax preparer should be permitted to conduct discovery proceedings in order to establish the government's motive in issuing
the summons, thereby discerning whether prosecution has been recommended.8 2 The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure govern in such situations,
giving a party the right to examine a deponent on any matter not privileged
83
which is relevant to the subject matter involved in the pending action.
The federal rules, however, also grant the district courts considerable discretion to suspend or limit discovery,8 4 as was the case in Turner.8 5
79. See DiPiazza v. United States, 415 F.2d 99, 103 (6th Cir. 1969), cert. denied,
402 U.S. 949 (1971); accord, United States v. Powell, 379 U.S. 48, 58 (1964); United
States v. Ryan, 379 U.S. 61, 62 (1964); United States v. Turner, 480 F.2d 272, 279
(7th Cir. 1973); United States v. Held, 435 F.2d 1361, 1364 (6th Cir. 1970), cert.
denied, 401 U.S. 1010 (1971). See also United States v. Mothe, 303 F. Supp. 1366
(E.D. La. 1969) and cases cited therein.
80. United States v. Billingsley, 469 F.2d 1208 (10th Cir. 1972). Therein the
court stated "the potential for civil liability necessarily accompanied the potential for
criminal prosecution . . . the civil aspects are inextricably associated with the crimi-

nal." Id. at 1209-10.

81. United States v. Roundtree, 420 F.2d 845, 852 (5th Cir. 1959). Sometimes
establishing even dominant criminal overtones is insufficient. In United States v. Held,
435 F.2d 1361 (6th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 1010 (1971) the court held that
even where the primary purpose of the summons was to further a criminal investigation, a secondary purpose of determining civil tax liability would nonetheless support
the validity of the summons. Id. at 1364.
82. United States v. Roundtree, 420 F.2d 845, 852 (5th Cir. 1959); United States
v. Nunally, 278 F. Supp. 843, 845-46 (W.D. Tenn. 1968); accord, United States v.
Moriarty, 278 F. Supp. 187, 188-89 (E.D. Wis. 1967); Kennedy v. Rubin, 254 F. Supp.
190, 193-94 (N.D. Ill. 1966). But see United States v. Schmidt, 360 F. Supp. 339,
343 (M.D. Pa. 1973); United States v. Wall Corp., 475 F.2d 893, 895 (D.C. Cir.
1972) (discovery of special agents' purpose was denied as the taxpayers had ample
opportunity to probe for bad faith of the agents at enforcement hearings). See also
Abel Investment Co. v. United States, 29 Am. Fed. Tax R.2d 894, 895-96 (D. Neb.
1971). Since 1970, taxpayers have also been able to improve their defensive position
by compelling the production of IRS manuals, code books and private rulings from
the Internal Revenue Service under the Freedom of Information Act. See generally
Hawkes v. IRS, 467 F.2d 787 (6th Cir. 1972); Tax Analysis & Advocates v. IRS, 362
F. Supp. 1298 (D.D.C. 1973); Long v. United States, 349 F. Supp. 871 (W.D. Wash.
1972).
83. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b). The federal rules are applicable to enforcement proceedings as indicated by the Supreme Court in Donaldson v. United States, 400 U.S.
517, 528 n.11 (1971).
84. A district court may suspend or limit discovery in the interest of obtaining
"an expedited disposition of a summons proceeding," pursuant to Rule 81(a)(3). See
United States v. National State Bank, 454 F.2d 1249, 1252 (7th Cir. 1972); United
States v. Bell, 448 F.2d 40, 42 (9th Cir. 1971).
85. United States v. Turner, 480 F.2d 272, 275-76 (7th Cir. 1973).
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ProtectionAgainst UnreasonableSearches and Seizures
In light of the decision of the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit
in United States v. Theodore,8 6 the most treasured right of the tax preparer
is his fourth amendment protection against unreasonable searches. Though
the status of this privilege is considerably clearer than that of the fifth amendment, it is still important to be cognizant of the fact that the tax preparer
is seeking to protect his own rights and not those of a third party.
Unlike the protections of the fifth amendment, fourth amendment protections are applicable to corporate entities. 87 Hence, where evidence is
illegally obtained from corporate records, it may be suppressed 8 In
United States v. Humble Oil & Refining Co.,89 the IRS issued a section 7602
summons commanding the production of certain corporate records9" relating
to Humble's mineral lease transactions for the calendar year of 1970, in
order to assess the tax liability of "John Doe" (persons unknown). Humble answered the government's petition to enforce the summons, alleging
it to be fictional (as there was no specific taxpayer under investigation), arbitrary, an unwarranted invasion of personal liberty and an unreasonable
search and seizure in violation of the fourth amendment. 9 ' According to
the testimony of an IRS agent, the summons was issued to gather information on the business practices of local industry to allow the IRS to keep up
to date on its tax enforcement. He also testified that the summons was not
pursuant to an audit of Humble, nor to investigate its business practices or
tax liability, nor was the group, referred to in the summons as "John Doe,"
identifiable persons that the IRS had in mind when the summons was issued.912 In effect, the project was one of research (a situation not unlike the
86. 479 F.2d 749 (4th Cir. 1973).
87. United States v. Crespo, 281 F. Supp. 928, 935 (D. Md. 1968); accord, United
States v. Dauphin Deposit Trust Co., 385 F.2d 129 (3d Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390
U.S. 921 (1968). See also United States v. Northwest Pa. Bank & Trust Co., 355 F.
Supp. 607, 610 (W.D. Pa. 1973); United States v. First Nat'l Bank, 173 F. Supp. 716,
720 (W.D. Ark. 1959).
88. United States v. Crespo, 281 F. Supp. 928, 935 (D. Md. 1968).
89. 346 F. Supp. 944 (S.D. Tex. 1972), afI'd, 488 F.2d 953 (5th Cir. 1974).
90. The summons issued in the matter of John Doe's tax liability commanded
Humble as follows:
To produce records of Humble Oil & Refining Company for the calendar year
1970 concerning mineral leases surrendered during the year without production
obtained on the leasehold, such records to show the following facts:
Name, address and social security number of lessor. Amount of lease bonus.
Month and year lease executed. Legal description of the property leased.
The above information is requested only for leases where the lease bonus exceeded $10,000.
United States v. Humble Oil & Refining Co., 346 F. Supp. 944, 945 (S.D. Tex. 1972),
a!i'd, 488 F.2d 953 (5th Cir. 1974).
91. Id. at 945.
92. Id. at 946.
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Tax Preparers Project).
Though the court stated in its decision that it did not reach the question
of whether issuance of the summons would constitute an unreasonable search
and seizure under the fourth amendment, 93 it did refuse to grant its enforcement. In answer to the government's contention that sections 7601
and 7602 granted authority for such an investigation, the Federal District
Court for the Southern District of Texas stated:
[T]he powers conferred upon the Internal Revenue Service by these
statutes is [sic] broad, but it does not encompass situations such as the
present one when the Internal Revenue Service does not have any taxpayer under investigation. There must be some nexus between the
information sought and a specific investigation of specific individuals
before the government can compel third parties, at their own expense,
to give information to the Internal Revenue Service ...
. . . To have such a relationship between the information and an
investigation of a taxpayer there must first be an actual investigation
of a person or an examination of a return and here there is none.
Certainly, the extraordinary power of the federal district courts in this
area of summons and possible contempt for failure to comply should
not be used to aid an agency of the government to obtain information
in situations where no actual 94
controversy exists between the government and any known individual.
The overwhelming similarity between the situation in this controversy and
that created in those under the Tax Preparers Project should be an indication
to the tax preparer that strong arguments are available to him in this area.
1. Misrepresentation. Under the IRS's Tax Preparers Project, undercover agents pose as ordinary taxpayers seeking the services of the tax preparers. Whether the courts will interpret such an activity as material misrepresentation, calling for the exclusion of any evidence subsequently obtained through this approach, remains to be seen. 95 It should be noted,
however, that evidence gathered by an agent who had intentionally misled
a tax preparer into believing that he was investigating other taxpayers has been
suppressed as an unlawful seizure. 96
2. Materiality and Relevancy. In the absence of a showing that the
documents requested are material and relevant to a reasonable investigation
of a taxpayer, a section 7602 summons issued by the IRS will generally be
93. Id. at 947.
94. Id. at 947.
95. A recent Tax Court decision has held the exclusionary rule of Weeks v. United
States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914) to be applicable in civil tax proceedings. See Efrain T.
Suarez, 58 T.C. 792 (1972).
96. Goodman v. United States, 285 F. Supp. 245, 251-52 (C.D. Cal. 1968). See
also Goodman v. United States, 369 F.2d 166, 168 (9th Cir. 1966).
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held unenforceable. 9 7 The test of materiality and relevancy, however, is a
rather lenient one and there is no necessity for establishing that probable
cause existed as a basis for the inquiry. 98 The court in Humble set forth
the appropriate standard of relevancy:
[T]he judicial protection against the sweeping or irrelevant order is
particularly appropriate in matters where the demand for records is
directed not to the taxpayer but to a third-party who may have had
some dealing with the person under investigation. And so this court
has held that a District Court asked to enforce a summons must determine not only whether this burden imposed is unreasonably onerous,
but also whether the records sought were relevant to the investigation,
not in the sense of an affirmative showing of probable cause, but
"whether the inspection sought might have thrown light on the correctness of the taxpayer's returns." 99
The burden, then, is upon the IRS to make this showing. As the Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit pointed out in Teamsters Local 174 v. United
States,'0 0

Neither the revenue agent nor the Court has authority under the
statute to require the production of memoranda, books, etc., of third
parties unless they have a bearing upon the return or returns under
investigation.
"The agents are not the sole judges as to the scope of the examination.
They must satisfy the Court that what they seek may be actually
needed. Otherwise, they would be assuming inquisitorial powers be'
yond the scope of the statute." 10
3. Proper Purpose. In 1964 the Supreme Court held that a taxpayer
could challenge a summons issued pursuant to Section 7602 of the Internal
Revenue Code where the material requested is for the improper purpose of
obtaining evidence to be used in a criminal prosecution.10 2 Later in the
97. Venn v. United States, 400 F.2d 207, 211 (5th Cir. 1968). See also Teamsters
Local 174 v. United States, 240 F.2d 387, 390 (9th Cir. 1956); United States v. Buck,
356 F. Supp. 370, 375-76 (S.D. Tex. 1973), aff'd, 479 F.2d 1327 (5th Cir. 1973); United
States v. Jones, 351 F. Supp. 132, 133-34 (M.D. Ala. 1972); United States v. First Nat'l
Bank, 173 F. Supp. 716, 720 (W.D. Ark. 1959). In 1947 the Court of Appeals for the
Fifth Circuit stated: "A third party should not be called upon to produce records and
give evidence under the statute unless such records and evidence are relevant to, or bear
First Nat'l Bank v. United States, 160 F.2d
upon, the matter being investigated .....
532, 533 (5th Cir. 1947).
98. United States v. Powell, 379 U.S. 48, 57 (1964); Foster v. United States, 265
F.2d 183, 186 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 360 U.S. 912 (1959).
99. United States v. Humble Oil & Refining Co., 346 F. Supp. 944, 947 (S.D. Tex.
1972), alf'd, 488 F.2d 953 (5th Cir. 1974), quoting Foster v. United States, 265 F.2d
183 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 360 U.S. 912 (1959).
100. 240 F.2d 387 (9th Cir. 1956).
101. Id. at 390, quoting Martin v. Chandis Sec. Co., 33 F. Supp. 478, 480 (S.D. Cal.
1940).
102. Reisman v. Caplin, 375 U.S. 440, 449 (1964).
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same year, the Supreme Court in United States v. Powell 03 delineated the
burden which must be met by the IRS at an enforcement proceeding. The
government was required to show that
the investigation will be conducted pursuant to a legitimate purpose,

that the inquiry may be relevant to the purpose, that the information
sought is not already within the Commissioner's possession, and that
the administrative steps required by the Code have been followed
104

Then in 1971, the Supreme Court reiterated its interpretation, holding that
any internal revenue summons may be issued under section 7602 to aid an
investigation, if issued in good faith and prior to a recommendation for
criminal prosecution.' 05 The Court also made it clear that only where the
sole object of the investigation is to gather data for criminal prosecution is
the petition to enforce the summons to be refused. 10 6 However, the Court
noted that the use of the summons has been granted "even where it is alleged that its purpose is to uncover crime,''1 0 7 so long as criminal prosecution
has yet to be instituted. Thus when both a proper and an improper purpose
exist, the summons will still be issued.' 08 In this respect the recipient's
hands are virtually tied, as the determination of civil tax liability can always
be claimed to be at issue where such an investigation is made.' 0 9 The
purpose of gathering evidence for criminal prosecution then, is not fatal to
the summons unless it constitutes the singular purpose for its issuance. 1" 0
According to the Manual of Instructions for Revenue Agents,"' only when

a special agent is involved in an investigation, is it a criminal investigation.
Taxpayers and third parties have challenged the validity of a section 7602
summons on this very basis. 1 2 In United States v. Artman,113 the court
103. 379 U.S. 48 (1964).
104. United States v. Powell, 379 U.S. 48, 57-58 (1964) (emphasis added).
105. Donaldson v. United States, 400 U.S. 517, 536 (1971).
106. id. at 533.
107. Id. at 532, and cases cited therein. See also United States v. Egenberg, 443
F.2d 512 (3d Cir. 1971); United States v. Ruggeiro, 425 F.2d 1069 (9th Cir. 1970),
cert. denied, 401 U.S. 922 (1971).

108. The Court in DiPiazza v. United States, 415 F.2d 99 (6th Cir. 1969), cert.
denied, 402 U.S. 949 (1971) stated: "Where the investigation may produce both civil
and criminal evidence, the summons under section 7602 is a proper device for obtaining

records." Id. at 103.

109. See United States v. Billingsley, 469 F.2d 1208, 1209-10 (10th Cir. 1972);
United States v. Held, 435 F.2d 1361, 1364-65 (6th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S.
1010 (1971).
110. See United States v. Weingarden, 473 F.2d 454 (6th Cir. 1973).
111. IRS, MANUAL OF INsTRUCTIONS FOR REVENUE AGENTS 678, cited in United
States v. Lipshitz, 132 F. Supp. 519, 521 (E.D.N.Y. 1955). See also United States
v. Moriarty, 435 F.2d 347, 348-49 (7th Cir. 1970).
112. DiPiazza v. United States, 415 F.2d 99 (6th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 402 U.S.
949 (1971). See also United States v. Kessler, 338 F. Supp. 420 (S.D. Ohio 1972),
rev'd, 474 F.2d 995 (6th Cir. 1973); United States v. Gower, 271 F. Supp. 655 (M.D.
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rejected such an argument stating that the burden to show that the summons was issued for an unlawful purpose is on the party objecting to the
summons. "That burden is not met by merely showing that the agent issu114
ing the summons is a special agent of the IRS."
Objecting to a section 7602 summons for reasons of improper purpose,
then, offers little protection for the tax preparer. According to Donaldson,
legitimate purpose can be established merely with a showing of good faith
in the absence of a recommendation for prosecution. 115 With discovery
procedures being reserved for the discretion of the court,"1 6 the tax preparer's burden to negate the existence of proper purpose" 7 approaches the
realm of the impossible.
8
4. UnwarrantedFishing Expeditions. In United States v. Harrington,"1
the court pointed out that
[T]he Government may not exercise its investigative and inquisitorial
power without limit-the examination is "unreasonable" and impermissible if it is overbroad, "out of proportion to the end sought," or if it is
"so unrelated to the matter properly under inquiry as to exceed the
investigatory power."" 9
Where a third party is in possession of documents which relate to a taxpayer being investigated by the IRS, he may object to the attempt to enforce
a section 7602 summons on the ground that the request made is so vague
as to constitute an unreasonable search and seizure.' 20 In holding the govPa. 1967); United States v. Turzynski, 268 F. Supp. 847 (N.D. Iln. 1967); Tillotson
v. Boughner, 225 F. Supp. 45, 47 (N.D. Ill. 1963), aff'd, 333 F.2d 515 (7th Cir.),
cert. denied, 379 U.S. 913 (1964).

113. 435 F.2d 1375 (6th Cir. 1970).
114. United States v. Artman, 435 F.2d 1375, 1377 (6th Cir. 1970). See Donaldson v. United States, 400 U.S. 517, 534-35 (1971); United States v. Kessler, 338 F.
Supp. 420 (S.D. Ohio 1972), rev'd, 474 F.2d 995 (6th Cir. 1973). However, in United
States v. Kleckner, 273 F. Supp. 251 (S.D. Ohio), appeal dismissed, 382 F.2d 1022
(6th Cir. 1967), the court denied enforcement of the IRS summons and sustained the
taxpayer's argument that the special agent's purpose was to obtain information for
criminal prosecution, and not to assess any civil tax liability. Id. at 252.
115. Donaldson v. United States, 400 U.S. 517, 536 (1971).
116. United States v. National State Bank, 454 F.2d 1249, 1252 (7th Cir. 1972);
United States v. Bell, 448 F.2d 40, 42 (9th Cir. 1971).
117. See United States v. Berkowitz, 355 F. Supp. 897, 900 (E.D. Pa. 1973), alf'd,
488 F.2d 1235 (3d Cir. 1974), and cases cited therein; accord, United States v. Powell,
379 U.S. 48, 58 (1964); United States v. Weingarden, 473 F.2d 454, 461 (6th Cir.
1973); United States v. Ferrone, 438 F.2d 381 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 1008
(1971); United States v. Artman, 435 F.2d 1375, 1377 (6th Cir. 1970); DiPiazza v.
United States, 415 F.2d 99, 103 (6th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 949 (1971);
United States v. Oaks, 360 F. Supp. 855, 858 (C.D. Cal. 1973); United States v.
Nunally, 278 F. Supp. 843, 846 (W.D. Tenn. 1968).
118. 388 F.2d 520 (2d Cir. 1968).
119. Id. at 523 (citations omitted); accord, United States v. Morton Salt Co., 338
U.S. 632, 652 (1950).
120. See United States v. DeGrosa, 405 F.2d 926, 928 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 394
U.S. 973 (1969); United States v. Harrington, 388 F.2d 520, 523 (2d Cir. 1968); Foster
v. United States, 265 F.2d 183 (2d Cir.). cert. denied, 360 U.S. 912 (1959); First Natl
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ernment to a standard of strict compliance one federal district court has
stated that the IRS must specify just what records it wants. 121 There, enforcement of a summons requiring production of several clients' records
from a bank was denied because the IRS failed to specify the exact names
of these individuals. 122 The court characterized the request as "unnecessarily broad," stating that its enforcement would be unduly burdensome on
123
the bank.
The requirement that a summons be specific is rooted in the constitutional requirement that it should not be unreasonably burdensome. 24 In
associating this aspect with relevancy, the court in United States v. Third
Northwestern National Bank,' 25 denied enforcement of a section 7602 summons, stating that a burden on a third party to search voluminous records
is unreasonable where the likelihood of discovering documents bearing on
the taxpayer's liability has not been shown.' 26 Again, in characterizing
such tactics as "fishing expeditions," it was held in United States v. Northwest
PennsylvaniaBank & Trust Co.,' 27 that
The bank does have the right to complain of unreasonable burdens thrust upon it in attempting to comply with a summons ....
"[T]he government is not entitled to go on a fishing expedition through
appellant's records. 12It8 must identify with some precision the documents
it wishes to inspect.'
The same principle is brought out in Stark v. Connally12 9 where it was
Bank v. United States, 160 F.2d 532, 534 (5th Cir. 1947); United States v. Crespo,
281 F. Supp. 928, 935 (D. Md. 1968); United States v. First Nat'l Bank, 173 F. Supp.
716, 720 (W.D. Ark. 1959).
121. United States v. Northwest Pa. Bank & Trust Co., 355 F. Supp. 607, 614 (W.D.
Pa. 1973); accord, United States v. DeGrosa, 405 F.2d 926, 928-29 (3d Cir.), cert.
denied, 394 U.S. 973 (1969); United States v. Dauphin Deposit Trust Co., 385 F.2d
129, 131 (3d Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 921 (1968); First Nat'l Bank v.
United States, 160 F.2d 532, 534 (5th Cir. 1947); United States v. Buck, 356 F. Supp.
370, 375 (S.D. Tex. 1973), aff'd, 479 F.2d 1327 (5th Cir. 1973); United States v.
First Nat'l Bank, 173 F. Supp. 716, 720 (W.D. Ark. 1959). But see United States v.
Anderson Clayton & Co., 31 Am. Fed. Tax R.2d 1330, 1331 (S.D. Miss. 1973).
122. United States v. Northwest Pa. Bank & Trust Co., 355 F. Supp. 607, 614
(W.D. Pa. 1973).
123. Id. at 614.
124. United States v. Dauphin Deposit Trust Co., 385 F.2d 129, 131 (3d Cir. 1967),
cert. denied, 390 U.S. 921 (1968). See also United States v. DeGrosa, 405 F.2d 926,
929 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 973 (1969); Hubner v. Tucker, 245 F.2d 35, 41
(9th Cir. 1957); United States v. Buck, 356 F. Supp. 370, 375 (S.D. Tex. 1973), afl'd,
479 F.2d 1327 (5th Cir. 1973); United States v. Northwest Pa. Bank & Trust Co., 355
F. Supp. 607, 610 (W.D. Pa. 1973).
125. 102 F. Supp. 879 (D. Minn. 1952).
126. United States v. Third Northwestern Nat'l Bank, 102 F. Supp. 879, 883 (D.
Minn. 1952).
127. 355 F. Supp. 607 (W.D. Pa. 1973).
128. Id. at 610, quoting United States v. Dauphin Deposit Trust Co., 385 F.2d 129,
131 (3d Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 921 (1968).
129. 347 F. Supp. 1242 (N.D. Cal. 1972).
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noted that "fishing expeditions" into private papers, or dragnet searches
carried out on the mere suspicion of possibly finding incriminating evidence,
have never been condoned by the courts. 130 Courts, however, have held
that a certain amount of fishing is justified if reasonable grounds for examination are shown. 13 1 "But the 'fishing' cannot amount to an inquisitorial or
arbitrary inquiry on the part of the tax investigators. A reasonable basis
132
for making the inquiry must exist."
The crucial question for the courts in applying this reasonable basis test
to the IRS's Tax Preparers Project, therefore, is whether or not the scope of
the examination is merely arbitrary or inquistitorial. Does the error of the
tax preparer in filling out a single tax return for a fictional taxpayer constitute a substantial reason to launch an unlimited fishing expedition into the
personal records of the tax preparer in order to supposedly determine the
13
liability of yet another party? The court in Theodore thinks not.
SIGNIFICANCE OF BERKOWITZ, TURNER AND THEODORE

In considering the objectives of the IRS in initiating the Tax Preparers
Project, it appears that the standards of good faith and proper purpose
established by the Supreme Court in Donaldson v. United States" 4 have
played the most influential role bearing upon the decisions coming forth
from the cases relating to the government's investigation of tax preparers.
Both Turner and Theodore have subscribed to the reasoning set forth in
Berkowitz which requires that the summons be (1) "issued by the IRS pursuant to section 7602 in furtherance of a legitimate purpose in good faith
and prior to a recommendation for criminal prosecution,"' 35 and (2) that
it be "precisely and narrowly drawn so as not to place a burden on respondents [the tax preparers] out of proportion to the objective sought to be
6
obtained.""1
130. Id. at 1250.

See also FTC v. American Tobacco Co., 264 U.S. 298, 305-06

(1924).
131.

In re Keegan, 18 F. Supp. 746, 748 (S.D.N.Y. 1937); accord, United States

v. Third Northwestern Nat'l Bank, 102 F. Supp. 879, 881 (D. Minn. 1952).
132. United States v. Third Northwestern Nat'l Bank, 102 F. Supp. 879, 881-82 (D.
Minn. 1952).
133. United States v. Theodore, 479 F.2d 749, 754-55 (4th Cir. 1973).
134. 400 U.S. 517 (1971).
135. United States v. Berkowitz, 355 F. Supp. 897, 902 (E.D. Pa. 1973), af'd, 488
F.2d 1235 (3d Cir. 1974); see United States v. Turner, 480 F.2d 272, 277-78 (7th Cir.
1973); United States v. Theodore, 479 F.2d 749, 753 (4th Cir. 1973).
136. United States v. Berkowitz, 355 F. Supp. 897, 902 (E.D. Pa. 1973), a! 'd, 488

F.2d 1235 (3d Cir. 1974); see United States v. Turner, 480 F.2d 272, 279 (7th Cir.
1973); United States v. Theodore, 479 F.2d 749, 755 (4th Cir. 1973). Though the
court in Turner did not find it necessary for the IRS to specifically name those persons
whose returns it sought to examine, it did require the summons to be specific in the
sense of compelling only those records which were material and relevant to the

investigation. United States v. Turner, 480 F.2d 272, 279 (7th Cir. 1973).
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Under these circumstances, all three courts have also recognized that the
alleged purpose of the government to determine the civil tax liability of the
taxpayer is legitimate and in good faith. 137 Because of this interpretation
by the courts, the tax preparer has in fact lost all access to his fifth amendment rights, regardless of the incriminating nature of the materials sought.
In the past, the courts have permitted the summons to issue (even where
there exists a strong likelihood of criminal prosecution) so long as it included
the proper civil purpose.' 3 8 In those cases, the likelihood of criminal prosecution referred to, however, pertained only to the taxpayer himself and not
to third parties. Of crucial significance then, is that the courts involved in litigation stemming from the Tax Preparers Project have failed to attribute any
great importance to the fact that the tax preparer may later be compelled
to avail himself for criminal prosecution because he has relinquished his
own personal property to assist in the investigation of "others."
Section 7602 authorizes the summons and examination of books, papers,
or other data "for the purpose of ascertaining the correctness of any return
. . . in respect of any internal revenue tax . ... ,139 Assessing civil tax
liability, then, is the only authorized justification for issuing a section 7602
summons, and by simply alleging that the assessment of a taxpayer's civil
tax liability is the reason for the investigation, the IRS can thereby acquire
the authority to criminally prosecute a defenseless third party. Such application of this summons is contrary to the meaning of the statute.
It is not the civil tax liability of the tax preparer which is under investigation here. 140 By allowing such issuance of the summons, the courts have
made it an instrument which can be used by the government to gather crim137. United States v. Turner, 480 F.2d 272, 278 (7th Cir. 1973); United States v.

Theodore, 479 F.2d 749, 753 (4th Cir. 1973); United States v. Berkowitz, 355 F. Supp.
897, 901-02 (E.D. Pa. 1973), aff'd, 488 F.2d 1235 (3d Cir. 1974).

138. Donaldson v. United States, 400 U.S. 517, 532 (1971) and cases cited therein.

See also United States v. Held, 435 F.2d 1361, 1364-65 (6th Cir. 1970), cert. denied,
401 U.S. 1010 (1971); United States v. Artman, 435 F.2d 1375, 1377 (6th Cir. 1970);
DiPiazza v. United States, 415 F.2d 99, 103 (6th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 402 U.S.
949 (1971).

139.

INT. REV. CODE OF

1954, § 7602.

140. The court in Theodore attaches no merit to this fact and dismisses it without
discussion, citing Hinchcliff v. Clarke, 371 F.2d 697 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 387 U.S.
941 (1967); United States v. Theodore, 479 F.2d 749, 754 (4th Cir. 1973). What
the court failed to state, however, was the fact that in the Hinchcliff case, though the
court there considered the summons to be valid and enforceable against a third
party in possession of pertinent records, none of the evidence gathered could be used
for criminal prosecution.
By brief and at oral argument the IRS seeks to assure this court (as it did the
District Judge) that its investigation in the Hinchcliff matter has no purpose of
possible criminal prosecution. . . . However this may be, our decision in this case
is squarely planted upon the representation made to us. Hence, no information
secured as a result of this decision may be employed in any criminal prosecution.
Hinchcliff v. Clarke, 371 F.2d 697, 701 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 387 U.S. 941 (1967)
(emphasis added).
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inal evidence against any third party, compelling him to give up his own
property under the guise of an investigation of another taxpayer. In the
eyes of the IRS, the tax preparer is supposedly a third party. He has the
duties of a third party (here the production of the requested materials), yet
because the summons is not, from outward indications, directed at his criminal liability (though criminal prosecution might certainly be the end result),
he has not the right to protect himself. In actuality, the summons is issued
directly to the tax preparer as an interested party, and the very controversy
141
involved is the fact that it is his own liability which is being questioned.
Where the possibility of criminal prosecution concerns parties other than

the taxpayer under investigation, the government should be estopped from
utilizing evidence obtained under the authority of a section 7602 summons.
Such use of this summons goes far beyond the purpose of "ascertaining the
correctness of any return,"'1 42 with respect to any internal revenue tax, and
43
must be considered an abuse of statutory power.'
141. This, in effect, was Turner's second defense but the court flatly rejected the
argument stating that the summons was directed "at an essentially civil area of inquiry." United States v. Turner, 480 F.2d 272, 278 (7th Cir. 1973). Yet in reality
the tax returns of Turner himself are not being examined. The civil liability at issue
is not his own, but that of other taxpayers. The only effect that this investigation
could have on Turner would be of a criminal nature, which is totally unrelated to the
"essentially civil area of inquiry." An examination of the Tax Preparers Project operational procedures reveals that this is the case. Where the IRS's audit uncovers errors in the tax preparer's computations of the returns, the affected taxpayers are contacted to pay any additional tax (undoubtedly the result of an essentially civil inquiry).
On the other hand, where the evidence collected during this very same audit supports
criminal prosecution of the tax preparer, the Intelligence Division of the IRS takes
charge just for that purpose. United States v. Theodore, 479 F.2d 749, 752 (4th Cir.
1973). In other words, the tax preparer is in actuality being deprived of his constitutional rights for although the IRS is conducting a civil inquiry which does not concern
him, with respect to the tax preparer, the inquiry of the Intelligence Division is undoubtedly criminal in nature. This is not to say that the tax preparer should not be made
to account for his activities in the preparation of returns for the public. However,
he should at least be afforded the rights which are guaranteed to all citizens under
our legal system. In litigation of this type, the courts would do well to seriously consider the words of Judge Weinman, in United States v. Kleckner, 273 F. Supp. 251
(S.D. Ohio), appeal dismissed, 382 F.2d 1022 (6th Cir. 1967) concerning the production of records for a supposed civil investigation which smacked of criminal implications. In upholding the constitutional protections of the taxpayer, he denied enforcement of the summons stating:
The purpose of the subpoenas cannot be said to be the obtaining of financial records relevant to a civil proceeding for the collection of income tax; the discovery
is directed toward the obtaining of information for the filing of a criminal action.
The Court would be naive to come to any other conclusion. Therefore, Logan cannot be required to produce the papers because of his privilege against self-incrimination.

Id. at 252.

142. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 7602.
143. This does not mean that the IRS should always be precluded from obtaining
books, papers, records, etc. for examination merely because the evidence is being gathered for criminal prosectuion. It simply means that where this is the case, a section
7602 summons is not the proper tool; IRS agents may instead obtain a search warrant

Published by Digital Commons at St. Mary's University, 2022

23

St. Mary's Law Journal, Vol. 5 [2022], No. 4, Art. 6

ST. MARY'S LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 5:773

With regard to the issue of whether the summons is so "precisely and
narrowly drawn so as not to place a burden on respondents [tax preparers]
out of proportion to the objective sought to be obtained,"' 144 the courts go
their separate ways. Turner held that a "John Doe" summons was sufficiently precise and narrow in this situation. 1 4 In so doing, this court relied
46
on the decision of the federal district court in United States v. Theodore,
which found a "John Doe" summons, calling for all the returns of a tax
preparer's clients, to be valid. 147 On appeal of Theodore, however, the
Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit expressly rejected this interpretation as applied to the Tax Preparers Project. 1 48 "Courts have in the past sanctioned the use of John Doe summonses, but all such cases involved either a
single unidentified taxpayer or a small group of unknown taxpayers.' 49 In
reversing the lower court's decision the court in Theodore limited the interpretation of a section 7602 summons:
We hold that this language only allows IRS to summon information
relating to the correctness of a particular return or to a particular person
and does not authorize the use of open-ended Joe Doe summonses.
Therefore, we find the summons directing Charles Theodore to produce
all of the returns and all of the work records relating to all of his clients
for the years 1969-1971 is too broad and too vague to be enforced.15 0
Note, however, that the court in Theodore did agree that the IRS was authorized to obtain from the tax preparer, via a section 7602 summons, the
names, addresses, and social security numbers of the taxpayers in question, if
the Commissioner could show that he has no other means of attaining this
information.' 5 ' As this was the only information sought in Berkowitz and
Turner, it would appear that, under the Tax Preparers Project, a section 7602
summons can be considered appropriate in procuring such data.
The operations of the Tax Preparers Project, however, do go beyond the
mere acquisition of names, addresses and social security numbers,' 52 and
it is in this regard that the most dramatic change in the course of the law
governed by Rule 41 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, which will afford
the party under investigation ample opportunity to be apprised of his rights. See INT.
REV. CODE OF 1954, § 7609(b); Vonder Ahe v. Howland, 31 Am. Fed. Tax R.2d 1075
(9th Cir. 1973).
144. United States v. Berkowitz, 355 F. Supp. 897, 902 (E.D. Pa. 1973), aff'd, 488
F.2d 1235 (3d Cir. 1974).
145. United States v. Turner, 480 F.2d 272, 279 (7th Cir. 1973).
146. 347 F. Supp. 1070 (D.S.C. 1972), rev'd, 479 F.2d 749 (4th Cir. 1973).
147. United States v. Theodore, 347 F. Supp. 1070, 1075 (D.S.C. 1972), rev'd, 479
F.2d 749 (4th Cir. 1973).
148. United States v. Theodore, 479 F.2d 749, 754-55 (4th Cir. 1973). But see
9154, at 83,167
United States v. Carter, CCH STAND. FED. TAX REP., U.S. TAX CAS.
(5th Cir. Dec. 26 1973).

149. Id. at 754.
150. Id. at 755.
151. Id. at 755.
152. Id. at 752.
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has occurred. The interpretation given by the Court of Appeals for the
Fourth Circuit in Theodore virtually destroys this government project as an
enforcement tactic of the IRS where it seeks more than merely this limited
information. 153 Therein the court stated:
[T]he Internal Revenue Service is not to be given unrestricted license to
rummage through the office files of an accountant in the hope of perchance discovering information that would result in increased tax liabilities for some as yet unidentified client. Section 7602 summonses
were not meant to give the IRS such investigative and inquisitorial
power.
. . . The Government cannot go on a "fishing expedition" through
appellants' records, and where it appears that the purpose of the summons is "a rambling exploration" of a third party's files, it will not be
enforced ...
Section 7602 summonses are not meant to serve as a tool to police
the accounting profession. Nor are they to be used to obtain from
large accounting firms the complete records of all clients so that the
IRS might5 4determine if there is an error in the return of some unknown
taxpayer.1
United States v. Theodore' 55 avails the tax preparer and any third party the
first significant opportunity to protect himself against the unwarranted
breadth of a section 7602 summons. It establishes their right to object to
such a summons where it does not relate to a particular return or a particular
person. This decision in effect pronounces that the IRS has gone too far,
it has "caught its limit" and has lost its "license to fish." Theodore has removed the unprecedented barb from the section 7602 summons which has
been indiscriminately used to hook its recipients.
Future of Tax PreparersProject
In light of the conflicting authority among the circuits concerning the
rights of the tax preparer, his defenseless susceptibility to criminal prosecution under a section 7602 summons, and the very extensiveness of the Tax
Preparers Project itself, 15 6 it appears to be almost inevitable that the issues
involved in these cases will eventually reach the Supreme Court, especially if
the IRS continues in seeking to compel the production of records, workpapers, documents, etc. Whether the high court would sustain the holding in
Theodore remains to be seen, but the decision does present very strong arguments for the protection of the constitutional rights which are thwarted by the
Tax Preparers Project. The constitutionality of the very Tax Preparers Pro153. See United States v. Theodore, 479 F.2d 749, 755 (4th Cir. 1973).

154. Id. at 754 (citations omitted).
155. Id.
156. According to the testimony of a supervisory IRS agent in Turner, about 175
tax preparers had been summoned in the Chicago area alone. United States v.
Turner, 480 F.2d 272, 274 (7th Cir. 1973).
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ject itself is also not beyond reproach. In addition to the fourth amendment
57
violation against unreasonable searches and seizures as noted in Theodore,'
there is some indication that the misrepresentation made to the tax preparer
by the IRS's undercover agents in the initial stages of these investigations is
also violative of fourth amendment protections.' 5l
CONCLUSION

The characterization of the investigative power of the Internal Revenue
Service as being inquisitorial is by no means a misnomer. The government's
authority to summon and examine documents, records and other materials
has been almost unlimited in scope. The courts have readily supported the
IRS's acquisition of information from both taxpayers and third parties alike
where the government simply alleges civil tax liability to be a purpose of
their investigation, even when a strong possibility of criminal prosecution
exists. Because of this tendency of the courts to sustain the government's
authority in these tax investigations, the weakness of the summons recipient
in defending his position is rather evident.
Under these circumstances, taxpayers and third parties as well have encountered considerable difficulty in 'effectively asserting their constitutional
rights. Often the uncertainty as to which rights are to be applicable in the
litigant's own situation interferes with his assertion of appropriate defenses.15 9
The courts have been quick to analogize from the rights of the taxpayer to
the rights of third parties, and now even to those of the tax preparer. Yet
do all these parties stand in the same position? It is suggested here that the
position of the tax preparer is distinguishable from that of other third parties, as he has a personal stake in the investigation in protecting himself
from criminal prosecution. If the tax preparer himself is not a part of the
157. United States v. Theodore, 479 F.2d 749, 754 (4th Cir. 1973).
158. See Goodman v. United States, 285 F. Supp. 245 (C.D. Cal. 1968).

159. See, e.g., United States v. Buck, 356 F. Supp. 370 (S.D. Tex. 1973), a!f'd, 479

F.2d 1327 (5th Cir. 1973) where the taxpayer saw his valuable fifth amendment
privilege slip through his fingers because he failed to assert his rights completely. In
Buck, the taxpayer "asserted the privilege as to two safety deposit boxes and their
contents . . . . Other records which taxpayer or his counsel deemed to be incriminating could have received similar protection." Id. at 377. Also in Foster v. United
States, 265 F.2d 183 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 360 U.S. 912 (1959) a London bank lost
out on a fourth amendment challenge. "[T]he Bank makes no claim that compliance
will cause it undue hardship." Id. at 188. In Dipiazza v. United States, 415 F.2d 99
(6th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 949 (1971), the taxpayer failed to take advantage of the possibility of improper purpose. 'The appellants did not even undertake to develop any facts to show that the summonses were issued for an unlawful
purpose." Id. at 102-03. In United States v. Schmidt, 360 F. Supp. 339 (M.D. Pa.
1973) the taxpayer neglected to assert fifth amendment privileges available to him.
"Since Schmidt does not contend that he would incriminate himself by testifying ....
it would be inconsistent with the policy of the privilege to allow him to assert it."
Id. at 344-45 (emphasis added).
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IRS's investigation to determine civil tax liability, he must be afforded access
to his constitutional rights, especially if he is to be compelled to reveal information which may result in his criminal prosecution. This reasoning should
also apply to any third party subject to the same criminal liability.
The litigation evolving from the recently established Tax Preparers Project
of the Internal Revenue Service has raised serious issues. Though the availability of fifth amendment privileges still appears to be burdened under the
efficaciousness of the government's pleadings, the decision of the Court of
Appeals for the Fourth Circuit in United States v. Theodore,160 with its
strict interpretation of the language in Harrington and its application of the
principles espoused in Humble, has taken a needed step toward restoring
the protection guaranteed under the fourth amendment to its proper place.
This decision may also be the turning point in the case law, leading to a
more rigid interpretation by the courts of the government's authority in issuing and enforcing a section 7602 summons. No doubt, Theodore constitutes
a severe setback to the enforcement tactics utilized by the IRS under the
Tax Preparers Project, but hopefully it will also lead to a widespread recognition of the constitutional privileges to which all third parties are entitled.
160. 479 F.2d 749 (4th Cir. 1973).
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